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 Teleological reasoning reflects the general tendency to view objects, behaviors 
and events in terms of their “purpose.” Although healthy educated adults tend to refrain 
from committing errors in teleological reasoning about objects, our knowledge regarding 
how adults reason about events is limited. It has been suggested that teleological 
reasoning biases our interpretations of emotionally significant and unexpected life events 
of which a physical or social cause is absent or unsatisfactory. The current investigation 
seeks to better understand the types of events that evoke a teleological perspective and 
the conditions and individual difference factors that facilitate it. The results revealed that 
participants high in religiosity and low in ACT science reasoning are more likely to 
commit teleological errors (i.e., imbuing purpose upon events with non-intentional causal 
forces). Additionally, participants of low religiosity were more likely to commit 
teleological errors when placed under cognitive load. It appears that two routes to 
teleological reasoning exist: one that represents an explicit belief system such as religion, 
and one that reflects implicit intuitions about how the world works. These findings shed 
light on how, when confronted with certain life events, both our belief systems and 
situational pressures lead us to rely on intuitive assumptions rather than engage in careful 
consideration of more scientifically sound alternatives.  
Keywords: teleology, reasoning, purpose of events, dual-process model 
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Teleological Reasoning in College-age Adults: 
Believing in the Purpose of Events 
The ability to appreciate the “purpose” behind objects and behaviors is 
fundamental to successful cognitive functioning. Such ability is reflected in what is 
referred to as teleological reasoning. Specifically, teleological explanations have been 
described as assumptions that “objects, behaviors, or events occur for a purpose” 
(Kelemen, 1999b, p. 1440). We engage in this type of reasoning when we assume that an 
individual behaves in a way to achieve particular goals or speculate about the function of 
an object. For example, we may assume that a person opens a door with the purpose of 
going into a building or that a phone exists for the purpose of communication with others. 
Such reasonable assumptions allow us to make predictions about the intended nature or 
function of what we might encounter in everyday life.  
It would be illogical to presume a purpose-based explanation for all categories, 
however. For example, a teleological error is reflected in unwarranted explanations of 
why birds exist or why the recent earthquake in Japan occurred. Simply, these two 
examples were not intended for a purpose. Although a reasonable adult would agree that 
the former example does not warrant a teleological explanation, the latter example may 
not inspire the same agreement. It has been suggested that the tendency to perceive 
meaningful life events as occurring for a purpose is due to a strong bias to detect agency 
and intentionality in general, and this bias is hard to suppress (Bering, 2002). That is, our 
need to detect the purpose behind someone else’s behavior drives our need to detect the 
purpose behind events, especially those that are unexpected and trigger “significant 
affect-related change” (Bering, 2002, p. 18). Empirical support for this suggestion 
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however, needs bolstering.  The goal of the present study is to investigate the prevalence 
of teleological errors in reasoning about events in adults, the conditions under which they 
are activated or suppressed, and individual difference factors that predict their expression. 
 Although much is known about the impact of development on teleological 
reasoning about object categories, the research in regard to events has been limited to 
investigations of superstitious thinking. Therefore, the present review will be dedicated to 
these areas of research. 
Developmental Literature Regarding Teleological Reasoning about Objects 
 Investigations into the development of teleological reasoning have revealed that 
children, unlike adults, have a general tendency to explain all object categories in terms 
of their purpose. Kelemen (1999a, p. 244) has labeled children’s general inclination to 
endorse unwarranted teleological explanations “promiscuous teleology.” Moreover, she 
suggests children’s broad application of a teleological stance results from a burgeoning 
understanding of intentionality and agency. With exposure to alternative explanations, 
scientific reasoning and perhaps schooling, teleological explanation becomes restricted to 
appropriate categories (e.g., man-made artifacts and biological parts). In her landmark 
study, preschool children and adults were asked to explain what objects and their 
respective parts (living things, artifacts and non-living natural entities) were “for”, with 
the opportunity to state that they were not for anything. The results of the study indicated 
that children offered teleological explanations far more broadly than adults did. 
Specifically, adults limited their explanations that an object was “for” something to 
artifacts (e.g., clocks) and biological parts (e.g., ear). By contrast children offered 
function-based explanations for objects from all categories (e.g., cloud is “for the sun to 
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go on”). In the second study, both groups were specifically asked if the object was “made 
for something” to be sure the children were not confusing what the object in question was 
for with what it could do (e.g., “clouds are for raining”). Once again, children offered 
teleological explanations far more broadly than did adults. These results support the 
existence of promiscuous teleology in children and demonstrate that teleological 
reasoning may become constrained throughout development.  
 Additional evidence suggests that teleological reasoning may change with 
development. Kelemen (1999b) conducted a study that compared the explanations given 
by children of different ages (first-, second- and fourth-grade students) with those of 
adults. Participants were presented with photos of novel prehistoric animals and non-
living natural objects and asked to choose between a teleological or physical explanation 
for a particular object property. The nature of the teleological alternative varied by 
whether the type of purpose was other-serving or self-serving. For example, the prompt  
“Why do you think the rocks are so pointy?” was followed by a physical alternative 
“because little bits of stuff piled up over a long period of time” and a self-serving 
teleological alternative “so that animals would not sit on them and smash them” or an 
other-serving teleological alternative “so that animals like Cryptoclidus could scratch on 
them when they got itchy” (p. 1443). Children were again found to endorse unwarranted 
teleological explanations significantly more than adults even when instructed to think 
“like a scientist.” However, in contrast to the younger children, fourth-grade children 
showed lower levels of teleological bias for nonliving natural objects and limited their 
preference to social-serving explanations for biological properties. Kelemen suggested 
that this effect might be due a maturing understanding of science and perhaps the belief 
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that nature seeks homeostasis. Therefore it seems that initially, children’s growing ability 
to detect agency and manipulate objects to achieve goals might provide the basis for 
which a teleological bias develops but progressively becomes constrained over the course 
of development. However, teleological errors  may nevertheless remain a default style of 
reasoning (Kelemen, 1999b).  
 The results of the two previously mentioned studies (Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b) 
seem to indicate that with age and experience the tendency to make teleological errors is 
reduced. However, findings from more recent studies suggest that conditions exist in 
which adults default to unwarranted teleological reasoning about object categories. Casler 
and Kelemen (2008) conducted a cross-cultural study comparing two groups of 
Romanian Roma who differed in years of schooling and number of science courses with 
data from previously obtained American samples. The groups made for an ideal 
comparison to ascertain the degree to which factors of development, scientific literacy or 
sociocultural context influence teleological reasoning in adults. Unlike their more highly 
educated counterparts and American adults, the low school exposure group responded 
much like children have in past studies. Specifically, the undereducated individuals made 
significantly more teleological errors than did the adults with higher education levels. 
The findings from this study suggest that a promiscuously teleological bias may not be 
unique to children. Rather, it may instead perseverate as a default response throughout 
development only to be constrained by formal exposure to scientific knowledge. 
 Further evidence for a persistent teleological stance throughout development 
comes from an investigation into the teleological beliefs of Alzheimer’s disease patients, 
a group known for deficits in categorical reasoning (Zannino, Perri, Carelismo, 
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Pasqualetti, & Caltagirone, 2002). Lombrozo, Kelemen and Zaitchik (2007) conducted a 
study comparing the endorsements of teleological or physical explanations of individuals 
with Alzheimer’s disease (AD), healthy elderly adults and healthy younger adults. 
Specifically, Lombrozo et al. suspected that if this form of dementia affects causal 
reasoning about objects detrimentally, the AD patients ought to respond in a manner 
similar to children. The results revealed that, although no differences were found in the 
responding of the healthy elderly individuals and the young adults, AD patients more 
broadly endorsed and preferred the teleological explanation. Interestingly, when asked 
about the causal origin of the object in question, the healthy individuals invoked “God” 
as an explanation significantly more than the AD patients. The results from the study 
provide further evidence of a teleological stance that adults may fail to suppress due to a 
compromised causal belief system. Also, it seems teleological intuition may exist 
independent of an explicit superstitious or religious beliefs. Rather, such reasoning may 
reflect a more fundamental type of processing that is fostered by culture. 
 Beyond investigations involving populations with low exposure to scientific 
knowledge and those with causal reasoning deficits, evidence indicates that a teleological 
bias exists in educated, healthy adults as well. Suspecting that teleological reasoning may 
have a motivational component, Davis, Juhl and Routledge (2010) conducted a study 
investigating the effects of mortality salience on endorsements of unwarranted 
teleological explanations in undergraduate students. The researchers found that when 
teleological beliefs were bolstered (i.e., told the unwarranted explanations were in fact 
“correct”) participants demonstrated lower levels of death thought accessibility compared 
to those in the control condition. Also, those who were exposed to a mortality salience 
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condition provided higher ratings on a scale measuring purposeful-world beliefs (e.g., 
“everything happens for a reason”). These findings suggest that healthy adults are not 
completely immune to a teleological bias, especially when motivated to reduce the 
uncomfortable emotions activated by thoughts of death in favor of maintaining a belief 
that life has a purpose. Moreover, purposeful beliefs likely reinforce a false sense of 
predictability, justice and personal control in the world.   
 Although teleological beliefs appear to have a motivational function, such beliefs 
may become activated in situations under which our ability to invoke effortful control 
and analytical reasoning are compromised. Kelemen and Rosset (2009) asked 
undergraduate participants to indicate whether or not a particular explanation was a 
“good” or “bad” way of explaining why things happen. The task was completed under 
speeded, moderately speeded and unspeeded conditions. The results of the study revealed 
that the number of unwarranted endorsements of teleological explanations increased with 
speed. Also, when controlling for speed, scientific knowledge and inhibitory control 
predicted endorsements of unwarranted teleological statements. However, beliefs in God 
showed no significant relationship with the teleological bias. Kelemen and Rosset 
conjectured that, even in formally schooled individuals, a teleological stance might 
remain accessible in adulthood when processing resources are limited. These results may 
reflect a deeper bias for purpose-based explanations that are tapped into when conditions 
prevent educated adults from explicitly rejecting them. Furthermore, the preference for a 
“purpose” is related to one’s ability to invoke analytic reasoning and not beliefs in a 
creator. Lomrozo et al. (2007) similarly found that unwarranted teleological beliefs about 
objects exist independent of beliefs about supernatural deities. Therefore, it seems that 
 7 
that although we intuitively see the purpose of an object, we do not as easily infer the 
designer who gave the object its supposed purpose.  
 The question is, what makes function-based explanations so easily accessible 
when more scientifically sound alternatives exist? A dual-process model of reasoning 
may help shed light on this issue. Specifically, it has been suggested by many that two 
distinct cognitive systems exist that influence our reasoning, judgment and social 
cognition (see Evans, 2008 for review). System 1 has been generally described as 
automatic, intuitive, low effort, pragmatic, evolutionarily old, and operating independent 
of working memory. By contrast system 2 reflects processing that is deliberate, 
analytical, high effort, logical, evolutionarily recent and constrained by working memory. 
System 2 processing does not simply replace system 1 processing, rather the two systems 
coexist throughout development and will be differentially activated given the demands of 
the situation in which reasoning occurs. Perhaps our teleological beliefs reflect our early 
intuitions about how the world works and more scientifically sound alternatives require 
greater effortful control to invoke. Such a perspective helps explain the differences that 
situational effects can have on adults’ endorsements of unwarranted teleological 
explanations. Nevertheless, educated adults tend to constrain teleological beliefs about 
objects to appropriate categories (i.e., biological parts and artifacts) given that system 2 
processing has not been constrained by situational factors. 
 In summary, it has been shown that children invoke teleological explanations in 
regard to object categories far more broadly than do adults (Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b). 
However, these developmental differences cannot be explained by mere maturity. 
Specifically, the sweeping tendency to view object categories from a teleological 
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standpoint is not merely replaced by a more advanced, analytical understanding of the 
world. It is instead constrained by an intact causal reasoning system, education, and 
cognitive availability. One could argue however that, unlike objects, emotionally 
significant events may be specially processed for determining their “purpose” as such 
events help us to make meaning out of our life narratives.  
The Existential Theory of Mind 
 Bering (2002; 2003) has proposed that our tendency to see purpose behind events 
is driven by ordinary processes involved in social cognition that are responsible for 
detecting agency and intentionality behind social behavior. Specifically, humans tend to 
process events for their meaning, or teleological purpose, similar to the way we reason 
about the behavior of others. Bering suggests that along with theory of mind, an 
evolutionarily advantageous ability that allows us to interpret and predict the behavior of 
others, humans have also evolved an “existential theory of mind” (EToM), which 
responds exclusively to events. Specifically, this system becomes activated when 
unexpected, emotionally significant events occur absent a clear or psychologically 
satisfactory reason for happening. In such instances, we search for the purpose behind the 
occurrence of the event so that we might infer some sort of meaning.  
 Empirical evidence suggests that humans may even be biased for intentional 
explanations. Namely, one classic study found that adults attribute intentionality behind 
the supposed behavior of geometrical shapes (i.e., items that are incapable of purposeful 
action)  moving on a screen in an apparently aggressive or cooperative way (Heider & 
Simmel, 1944). A more recent study found that, when placed under speeded conditions, 
participants were more likely to say that ambiguous acts (e.g., “he set the house on fire”, 
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“she woke up the baby”) were done intentionally rather than accidentally (Rosset, 2008). 
It seems that participants, when placed under processing demands, favored intentional 
explanations over the plausible accidental explanation. These results once again support 
the notion that purpose-based (i.e., teleological) explanations arrive at us with more ease 
than explanations that imply the event had no meaning.  
 Bering (2003) explains although the social domain of attribution provides targets 
(i.e., other individuals) to which we direct our intentionality bias, such targets are not 
always clearly responsible or psychologically satisfactory to the person evaluating the 
event. Such events include those that are unexpected and result in a strong emotional 
impact. To compensate, we often derive some sort of intended meaning or purpose from 
these events (e.g., “I was in a bad car accident when I was a teenager because I needed to 
learn that life is fragile”, Bering, 2002, p. 4). Bering is not specific about the nature of the 
emotional impact (i.e., positive or negative) and the literature is also inconsistent 
regarding this issue.  
 However, research suggests that people do in fact engage in the process of making 
meaning after experiencing an unexpected negative life event. Skaggs and Baron (2006) 
conducted a concept analysis including 86 references involving adults engaging in a 
search for meaning following a negative life event. From their analysis, the researchers 
suggested a model for understanding meaning making which explains that people seek 
congruency between one’s global meaning (i.e., general beliefs about one’s values, goals 
and purpose in life) and situational meaning (i.e., appraisals specific to individual events). 
Life events that are unexpected and negative often threaten our global meaning and lead 
us to engage compensatory processes to bring our interpretations of such events back into 
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congruency with our pre-existing global meanings. Such processes include changing the 
meaning of the event (e.g., reattribution of the cause, creating illusions) or changing our 
global meaning (e.g., reappraise event in a positive light, revalue mundane events to 
offset impact of negative event). These strategies, if successful, lead us to achieve what 
the authors refer to as “meaning congruence” or the positive outcome that results from 
the search for meaning. This process impacts psychological well-being as it allows 
individuals to emerge from negative situations with a more positive and appreciative 
outlook on life. The authors suggest that, if not for this process, individuals may 
experience the negative effects of meaning incongruence (e.g., depression, hopelessness, 
and discouragement).  
 Beyond a mere coping strategy however, the tenets underlying the proposed 
existential theory of mind suggest that meaning making reflects a deeper bias for 
intentionality and that this bias has evolutionary roots in systems responsible for social 
cognition. In fact, evidence suggests that the existential theory of mind may develop in a 
trajectory similar to ordinary theory of mind. Bering and Parker (2006) conducted a study 
with children ages 3-9 who, in the experimental condition, were told of a woman named 
“Princess Alice” with the magical ability to make herself invisible and who may possibly 
help them on a decision task. Children were asked to indicate which box contained a 
hidden ball. For some of the trials an unexpected event occurred (e.g., a picture falling, 
the light of a lamp flickering). The oldest children (7-9 years) were more likely to alter 
their choice and explained that the invisible agent was trying to help them correct the 
mistake than the younger children. The majority of the youngest children (3-4 years) did 
not change their behavioral response or did not offer an explanation at all. The middle 
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age group (5-6 years) also tended to not alter their response but told the researchers that 
they believed Princess Alice was responsible for the unexpected event. The 
developmental differences revealed in this study seem to match the developmental course 
seen with ordinary theory of mind—as the eldest children in this study demonstrated 
second-order, self-referential theory of mind capabilities (e.g., mentalizing an others’ 
thoughts about your thoughts), the middle age group demonstrating the ability to simply 
mentalize an other, and the youngest age group making no inferences about the unknown 
intentions of an other.  
 A related study recently found that, people with Asperger’s syndrome, a form of 
autism causing deficits in social reasoning and theory of mind, were less likely than 
neurotypical individuals to explain life events (e.g., contracting an illness, meeting a 
significant other) teleologically (Heywood & Bering, 2010). It seems that as our social 
reasoning becomes more sophisticated throughout development, so does our inclination 
that certain events were somehow intentionally caused. However, if our social reasoning 
abilities have been compromised at the neurological level, teleological reasoning does not 
manifest as it would in normal populations. The results from these two studies provide 
further evidence that believing in the purpose of events may be a consequence of a bias 
for processing information for their social content that is typical for normally developing 
individuals.  
 Discussing beliefs in the purpose of events would be inadequate without a 
mention of beliefs in God or other supernatural agents that may be invoked as the arbiter 
of events. In their review of the literature regarding attributions made to God as the 
causal agents of events, Gray and Wegner (2010) echo the sentiment of Bering (2002) 
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that believing in God reflects the activation of ordinary processes involved in social 
cognition such as perceiving the minds of others and appreciating their agentic ability. 
The authors state that in cases of “unjust suffering and undeserved salvation” (i.e., 
surprisingly positive or negative) absent a human cause, people are prone to seek out an 
agentic source, such as God, to blame or praise for willing the event to transpire. Thus, an 
overactive need to perceive agency helps us to fill in the gaps when unexpected events 
occur. Although this idea is consistent with ideas presented by Bering, Bering also points 
out that one’s existential theory of mind need not be culturally elaborated by supernatural 
agents such as God. In fact, one may actively deny the existence of God yet still seek out 
the purpose behind an unexpected event. One study found that although highly religious 
participants were most likely to invoke God as a causal agent behind an ambiguous event, 
participants moderate to low in religiosity frequently invoked other superstitious causes 
(e.g., “fate”) (Weeks & Lupfer, 2000). Thus, it seems that our social brain, specialized for 
agency and intentionality detection, provides the capacity for perceiving supernatural 
deities or forces as causal agents and culture defines them (Bering, 2002).   
Teleological Reasoning Specific to Events 
 In contrast to the studies of teleological beliefs about objects, which have found 
mostly situational effects on adults’ preferences for purpose-based explanations, the few 
investigations involving beliefs about the purpose of events have focused on individual 
differences. An understanding of how adults reason about events is important for 
determining how broadly teleological beliefs are invoked beyond object categories. 
Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) reasoned that superstitious, paranormal, and magical beliefs 
are similar to the category mistakes made by children (Kelemen 1999a, 1999b) in that 
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they reflect our early intuitions and are not replaced by analytic reasoning, but rather both 
types of reasoning coexist in adulthood. Participants from a previous study whose scores 
on a measure of superstitious beliefs were in the lower or upper 10% were recruited. The 
study, conducted using an online questionnaire, measured participants’ core knowledge 
confusions (e.g., material entities having mental attributes), the purpose of events, 
paranormal beliefs, emotional stability and analytical and intuitive thinking. Beliefs about 
the purpose of events were measured by ratings of the “purpose” of the event for short 
vignettes; for example, “The brakes of your car fail and you smash up with a stranger 
whom you will later marry. Did the brakes fail for a purpose?” (p. 736). In comparison to 
skeptics, superstitious individuals assigned more “purpose” to random, natural or 
artificial events. Also, when looking to distinguish superstitious individuals from 
skeptics, core knowledge confusion served as the best predictor followed by intuitive 
thinking. The results of this study indicate individual differences (i.e., core knowledge 
and intuitive thinking) have a strong influence on expressed superstitious beliefs.  
 Svedholm, Lindemen and Lipsanen (2010) conducted a more recent study 
investigating the individual variables affecting superstitious beliefs. The authors posited 
that believing in the purpose of events and superstitious beliefs are a part of the same 
phenomenon—general core knowledge confusion. Participants were Finnish volunteers 
directed to an online study with measures of core knowledge confusions, paranormal 
beliefs and the beliefs in the purpose of events. Of interest is the method used in the study 
2, which explicitly defines “purpose” as involving “intentional planning by a supernatural 
agent or force” (p. 261). The results of the study indicate that both paranormal beliefs and 
beliefs in the purpose of events are strongly related and are best predicted by the latent 
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factor of a general core knowledge confusion. Moreover, confusions of intuitive 
psychology (e.g., “old furniture knows things about the past”, p. 225) served as a strong 
predictor of both types of beliefs. The results of the study suggest that beliefs in the 
purpose of events ought to be viewed as a form of superstitious belief based on core 
knowledge confusions.  
 Although these propositions are compelling and inherently pose implications for 
our understanding of superstitious beliefs, empirical investigations into our beliefs in the 
purpose of events needs bolstering. The researchers also made note that Finnish students 
are typically low in paranormal beliefs, which may be a potential limitation to the 
generalizability of these results of the study. Also, the restrictive sampling leaves one to 
wonder how people in general may respond to this measure. The results from this study 
warrant an investigation into teleological reasoning about events in a less restrictive 
sample. Perhaps teleological beliefs of events are invoked in populations that are not 
necessarily highly superstitious because of the intuitive nature of teleological beliefs. 
Although the experimental literature regarding the purpose of events is sparse, it appears 
that such beliefs are differentially endorsed as a function of individual differences. 
However, a direct study of beliefs about the purpose of events with a more general 
sample is needed. Therefore, a preliminary study was conducted to address this issue. 
 Guggenmos (2011) conducted a study in an effort to assess beliefs in the purpose 
of events in a less restrictive sample and also directly compare teleological beliefs about 
object categories to those regarding events. Beliefs in the purpose of events were 
measured using Lindeman and Aarnio’s (2007) Confusion Between Intentional and Non-
Intentional Events scale (modified slightly for an English speaking sample) which 
 15 
requires participants to rate the likelihood that random, natural, artificial and intentional 
events happened for a purpose, with “purpose” defined as in the previously mentioned 
study by Svedholm, et al. (2010). Beliefs about objects were measured using the 
teleology task developed by Lombrozo et al. (2007) in which participants indicate which 
alternative explanation (teleological or mechanistic) they believe to be appropriate and 
also which they prefer in regards to objects from categories of biological organisms (e.g., 
dogs), biological parts (e.g., eyes), nonliving natural objects (e.g., trees), natural 
phenomena (e.g., rain) and artifacts (e.g., tables). The study also included a brief 
religiosity measure (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997) as religiosity was expected to operate as 
an individual difference variable in beliefs about events. Participants were 
undergraduates at Western Kentucky University who completed the study via online 
questionnaire.  
 The results of the study revealed several important considerations concerning the 
current study. First, consistent with the findings of Lombrozo et al. (2007), participants 
on average made few endorsements of unwarranted teleological explanations for object 
categories. The study also revealed that errors made for object categories do in fact 
correlate positively with errors made about the intentional nature of events. Therefore, it 
seems that both types of beliefs may reflect an underlying bias for teleological 
explanations in general. Religiosity scores correlated positively with errors made for the 
“appropriate” judgments but not correlated with “preference” judgments in regards to 
object categories. This finding suggests that those higher in religiosity are more likely to 
endorse the unwarranted teleological explanation of an object appropriate. However, 
those who preferred this explanation were not necessarily religious. After coming upon a 
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similar finding in their study, Lombrozo et al. suggested that although some adults 
rejected the appropriateness of the teleological explanation, “healthy adults are 
surprisingly willing to entertain scientifically questionable teleological explanations” (p. 
1004). These results are consistent with the previous research on beliefs about objects, 
which have found that healthy educated adults tend to be more restrictive with their 
endorsements of teleological explanations. Given errors regarding objects were correlated 
with errors regarding events, the present investigation is further justified in focusing on 
the under researched topic of beliefs about the purpose of events.  
 Consistent with previous studies regarding beliefs in the intentionality of events, 
Guggenmos (2011) also documented individual differences in the likelihood of rating an 
event as “purposeful.” As expected, those high in religiosity were significantly more 
likely than those low and high in religiosity to rate events as purposeful for both 
warranted and unwarranted vignettes. One’s level of religiosity may be indicative of how 
much they see life events as the workings of a higher plan constructed by a deity. 
Interestingly however, events leading to a positive outcome were allotted higher purpose 
ratings than those with neutral or negative outcomes. This effect did not interact with 
religiosity, meaning in general, participants allotted more purpose to the events leading to 
favorable outcomes (as if an intentional event can somehow be more intentional because 
it led a positive result).  
 Although Bering’s theory suggests that emotionally salient events are most likely 
to activate EToM processes, he does not predict that positive outcomes of events will be 
imbued with more purpose than negative outcomes. Given that this finding was not 
expected, some speculations as to why participants were responding this way were made. 
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Perhaps the hypothetical nature of the vignettes were tapping into what Weinstein (1980) 
had labeled “unrealistic optimism”, or the commonly held illusion that we are somehow 
more likely to experience good outcomes than bad outcomes and that bad outcomes are 
far more likely to happen to our peers than ourselves. Unrealistic optimism seems to 
serve as a motivational mechanism as we benefit from the self-enhancement made from 
comparing our odds to others’ and fortunate events make the possibility of achieving our 
goals all the more likely. If the positivity effect can be replicated in the main study of the 
present investigation, a new light might be shed on a previously unelaborated facet of 
teleological research: the importance of emotion and the motivation to believe that we are 
deserving of positive outcomes.  
Current Study 
 The literature discussed thus far describes two types of teleological beliefs, those 
about objects and those about events. Both areas of research suggest that adults are not 
simply immune to a teleological bias, However, the suspected causes proposed for 
unwarranted teleological beliefs differ. Adults’ preferences for purpose-based 
explanations are typically limited to the categories of artifacts and biological parts, except 
in situations of limited processing resources, mortality salience, deficits in causal 
reasoning and low exposure to scientific knowledge. The literature specific to the beliefs 
in the purpose of events suggests that teleological expression is due to individual 
differences related to superstitious beliefs. However, it has been suggested that believing 
in the purpose of events is a universal tendency and some individuals may simply attempt 
to suppress this bias (Bering, 2002). The current study was conducted with the goal of 
shedding light on the prevalence of teleological errors about events in college students 
 18 
and the potential conditions in which a teleological stance may be activated and how 
religious beliefs factor into these errors. Doing so may help us to better understand why 
rational people construe the events in favor of a purposeful world when more analytically 
sound alternative explanations exist. Moreover, the current investigation also explored a 
disagreement in the literature: whether or not teleological errors reflect a default style of 
reasoning or the expression of individual differences (i.e., religious belief). 
 Specifically, I investigated how limitations on processing resources (e.g., 
cognitive load) will affect participants’ judgments about the purpose of events compared 
to those who are not placed under such demands. If participants low in religiosity are in 
fact suppressing a teleological bias for events, it can be hypothesized that demands on 
executive functioning will reduce participants’ ability to inhibit a teleological response 
successfully. As suggested by Bering (2002), although individuals may use conscious 
effort to suppress the expression of EToM, teleological processing of events nevertheless 
remains active. This line of reasoning is consistent with findings in the object literature 
showing that participants placed under processing demands are prone to committing more 
teleological errors (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009).  
 A dual-process model perspective might suggest that alternatives to teleological 
explanations require a higher level of conscious effort to evoke that is dependent on 
working memory (Evans, 2008). Therefore, any additional demand on working memory 
will compromise one’s ability to fully rationalize the information. In fact, cognitive load 
has been found to impair one’s ability to appreciate situational factors and correctly infer 
dispositional differences when asked to make attributions about another individual 
(Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988). A more recent study found that participants in a 
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cognitive load condition were less likely to make utilitarian judgments (i.e., a decision in 
which the ends justify the means) than those who were not loaded (Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008). These authors suggest that utilitarian judgments 
require the controlled cognitive processing described as system 2 operations in dual-
process theories. In light of these findings, the present study provides the opportunity to 
determine whether or not similar experimentally induced hindrances on executive 
processing will result in higher levels of teleological reasoning about events.  
 In addition to assessing beliefs about specific events, the present investigation will 
also include items used in the study conducted by Davis et al. (2011) that measured 
participants’ beliefs in a purposeful world. In one of the three studies reported, the 
researchers found that participants placed under a mortality salience condition 
demonstrated higher scores on a purposeful world beliefs questionnaire compared to 
those in the control condition. They claim that participants might be motivated to see the 
world as purposeful to ease existential anxiety. It would be interesting to determine if a 
tendency to believe in the purpose of events is positively associated with beliefs in a 
purposeful world in general in participants. It is expected that cognitive load induction 
will facilitate beliefs in a purposeful world. Comparatively, participants in the control 
condition should generally demonstrate lower scores on this measure.   
 It is expected that religiosity will be a significant factor. That is, highly religious 
individuals will commit more teleological errors (i.e., a lot higher purpose ratings to non-
intentional events) than those low in religiosity. It is also hypothesized that the positivity 
effect will be more pronounced for all groups in the cognitive load condition, as the 
ability to reason more realistically about one’s chances to experience positive outcomes 
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will be hindered by processing demands. If Weinstein’s (1980) notion of unrealistic 
optimism serves to explain the positivity effect found in the preliminary data, then it can 
be expected that participants will be especially unrealistic about their odds of 
experiencing a good outcome.  
 In addition to religiosity, the present study will examine participants’ scientific 
reasoning ability (measured by ACT score). Although scientific reasoning has been a 
particularly important factor for predicting one’s likelihood to commit a teleological error 
in regard to objects (Lombrozo et al., 2007; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), it has not been 
specifically addressed in the literature involving beliefs about the purpose events. 
Kelemen and Rosset reported that, when controlling for speed, scientific reasoning 
predicted the number of teleological errors made by participants. One can posit that a 
strong appreciation of general scientific principles will be associated with a lower 
likelihood to commit a teleological error. This can be further assumed given that previous 
studies found one’s level of core knowledge confusions are predictive of a tendency to 
imbue non-intentional events with purpose (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Svedholm et al., 
2010).  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and sixteen young adults (61 men and 55 women) ranging in age 
from 18 to 25 years (M = 19.73 years, SD = 1.49 years) were recruited from Western 
Kentucky University to participate in this study. An additional 12 individuals participated 
in the study but were excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: no ACT 
science reasoning score reported (10 cases), irregular responding (1 case), or failure to 
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perform the auditory task (1 case). Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
cognitive load condition (n = 64) or the control condition (n = 52). 
 
Measures 
 Beliefs in the purpose of events. Individuals were presented with 24 vignettes 
depicting a hypothetical event and were encouraged to imagine the situation happening to 
them. Participants then indicated the extent to which they believed the event happened for 
a purpose on a five point rating scale ranging from: 1 = The event definitely did not have 
a purpose to 5 = The event clearly had a purpose. The vignettes used in this study have 
been adapted from those used by Lindeman and Aarnio (2007). Minor alterations to the 
scale include word changes so that the vignettes are written in a vocabulary familiar to 
our English speaking participant pool. Also, two additional items were added so equal 
numbers of stories are represented by each cause and outcome combination. Also, 
Guggenmos (2011) revealed that one item the Lindeman and Aarnio designed to be read 
as “intentional” received quite low purpose ratings from participants (i.e., “You and your 
friends race for fun and the tallest girl wins. Did the race have a purpose?”). A 
manipulation check was also conducted that asked participants to rate the outcomes of the 
events on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = absolutely negative to 7 = absolutely 
positive. For some of the items, average ratings of valence given by the participants were 
not consistent their intended valence (e.g., for the item “You unexpectedly meet an old 
acquaintance and you go for a coffee together” an average response of rather positive 
was given when the item was intended to be neutral). New items were constructed to 
replace these items (see Appendix A for a copy of the scenarios used). An analysis of 
variance revealed valence ratings for each outcome type (i.e., positive, negative and 
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neutral) differed significantly from each other F(2, 41) = 285.12, p < 0.001. Mean 
valence ratings are reported separately for each vignette.  
 Purposeful world beliefs questionnaire. Beliefs in a purposeful world were 
measured using a three-item scale developed by Davis et al. (2011). Participants rated the 
statements “Everything happens for a reason,” “The world has a grand purpose,” and 
“There’s a purpose for everything, even if we don’t realize it” on a seven-point scale 
ranging from: 1 = absolutely untrue to 7 = absolutely true. Thus, higher average scores 
on this measure should indicate a higher belief that the world is purposeful in general. 
This questionnaire has a strong internal validity (Chronbach Alpha = .87).  
 Religiosity. Participants’ religiosity levels were assessed using the Santa Clara 
Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSORFQ) developed by Plante and 
Boccaccini (1997). The measure includes 10 items designed to gauge an individual’s 
strength of faith on a four-point scale with high scores indicating higher levels of 
religiosity and low scores indicating lower levels of religiosity. The items in the 
SCSORFQ do not contain denominational content and therefore can assess faith in 
individuals regardless of an individual’s religious affiliation (or lack thereof). The 
SCSRFQ has a high internal reliability (Chronbach Alpha = .95) and high split-half 
reliability (r = .92). See Appendix B for a full version of the SCSORFQ.  
 Science reasoning. Science reasoning abilities were inferred from participants’ 
score on the ACT science test, which includes 40 items that measure one’s 
“interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and problem-solving skills required in the natural 
sciences.” Performance on this measure is totaled into one score. The content areas from 
which the items are drawn include biology, earth/space science, physics and chemistry. 
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Based on 2005-2006 data the ACT science test has a reliability of .80 with a mean score 
of 21.10 (ACT, 2007). The most recent score reported for the student was obtained. The 
goal is to determine participants’ scientific reasoning ability prior to completing the 
study.  
Cognitive Load Manipulation 
 Auditory detection task. The cognitive load induction was created by first 
obtaining a randomized list of numbers that coincided with letters of the English alphabet 
from Randomizer.org (a randomization service provided by the Social Psychology 
Network). Utilizing the “speech” service provided by a Macintosh operating system 
(version 10.5.8) and audio recording software, a recording was obtained of each letter 
read aloud at a rate of approximately one letter per second. Participants were instructed to 
keep track of every presentation of the letter “x” that they hear. In the sequence, the letter 
“x” is said 15 times.  
Materials  
 The items for the beliefs in the purpose of events questionnaire, the purposeful 
world beliefs questionnaire and the SCSORFQ were presented on a PowerPoint 
presentation. Each item contained in the beliefs in the purpose of events questionnaire 
was presented for 7 seconds and presented again immediately for an additional 7 seconds 
with the event in question underlined. This was done to ensure the participants first read 
the vignette in its entirety before considering the purpose of the event. There were four 
different orders of these items, which were determined through randomization. The 
purposeful world beliefs questionnaire was presented for only for 7 seconds. Items for 
both questionnaires were separated by a slide featuring an asterisk in the center to allow 
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for a pause lasting for 4 seconds. The religiosity items were displayed on a single, 
untimed slide. All items were formatted to display at the center of the screen in Arial 36-
point font.  
 Participants were given a packet containing a response sheet for the measures 
mentioned previously. On each page of the packet, an empty column ran alongside the 
items. Participants in the experimental condition were told that the space is provided for 
them to keep a tally for each time they detect the letter “x” auditorially. Participants in 
the control condition were not given any information about this space.  
Procedure 
 Sessions for this study took place in classrooms located in Gary Ransdell Hall on 
Western Kentucky University’s campus. Initially, participants read informed consent 
documents explaining the nature of the task. Once informed consent was obtained, 
participants were told to read the instructions (see Appendix A) for the first portion of the 
study (i.e., Beliefs in the Purpose of Events and Purposeful World Beliefs measures). 
Participants in the cognitive load condition were given additional instructions to complete 
the auditory task. Specifically, these participants were asked to make a tally for every 
time they heard the letter “x” in the margin of the survey packet. The experimenter 
encouraged the participants to be as accurate as possible on both tasks. With inspiration 
from the study by Gilbert et al. (1988), participants in the experimental condition were 
told that the researcher is interested in how well people can complete two dissimilar tasks 
at the same time.  
 Prior to the presentation, the researchers dimmed the classroom lights and setup 
the PowerPoint presentation. Before the main task, the participants completed a practice 
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trial, which included 4 of items written to mimic those by Lindeman and Aarnio (2007). 
Individuals assigned to the cognitive load condition completed a version of the practice 
trial that was coupled with a practice auditory task. Following the practice trial, 
participants began the main task, which included the Beliefs in the Purpose of Events and 
the Purposeful World Beliefs questionnaires along with the auditory task for those in the 
cognitive load condition. Once the main task was completed, participants in both groups 
were given a 1-minute break. Participants then filled out the religiosity questionnaire and 
a brief demographic measure. Additionally, participants provided their WKU 800 
number, a unique identification code assigned to each student at the university, which 
allowed the researcher to access each participant’s ACT science reasoning score through 
TopNet. Finally, participants were debriefed on the true nature of the study, thanked for 
their participation and excused. The study took about 20 minutes to complete.   
Results  
Relationships Among Measures 
  Preliminary analysis of the data looked at the relationship among measures used 
in the study.  Descriptive statistics for all measures are shown in Table 1. Correlational 
analyses (Pearson’s r for all correlations) were conducted among ACT science reasoning 
scores, average teleological errors for events, average purposeful world ratings, and 
average religiosity scores. As shown in Table 2, all correlations among these variables 
were found to be significant. A subsequent correlational analysis was done to determine 
if there was a relationship between ACT science reasoning and auditory tally. This 
correlation was found to not be significant (r = .01, p = .916). Therefore, it can be ruled 
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out that those with higher ACT science reasoning scores had higher accuracy on the 
auditory task.  
Beliefs in the Purpose of Events Analysis 
  A 4 (order: 1, 2, 3, 4,) x 4 (cause type: intentional, artificial, random, natural) x 3 
(valence: positive, neutral, negative) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
scores for beliefs in the purpose of events with order as a between-subjects variable to 
ensure the order of items did not impact ratings. As expected, scores did not differ 
between the four orders of presentation, F(3, 112) = 1.19, p = .317. A 2 (condition: 
cognitive load, no cognitive load) x 3 (intentional outcome type: positive, neutral, 
negative) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that performance on the intentional items 
(M = 3.70, SD = .78) did not differ between the conditions, F(1, 124) = .19, p =.732. 
Intentional items were therefore dropped from further analyses. 
 Participants were designated to one of three groups based on their ACT science 
reasoning score. Grouping was determined by calculating percentile values (~33% and 
~66%) to produce 3 equal groups. Those with scores less than or equal to 19 were 
assigned to the “low” ACT group (n = 34), those with scores between 20 and 22 were 
assigned to the “medium” ACT group (n = 42), and those with scores 23 and above were 
assigned to “high” ACT group (n = 40). The percentiles generated for this dataset match 
well onto national norms, with a score of 19 representing the 38thpercentile, a score of 20 
representing the 47th percentile, and a score of 23 representing the 71st percentile (ACT, 
2012). In order to assess the effects of cognitive load on beliefs in the purpose of events 
scores, a 2 (condition: cognitive load, no cognitive load) x 3 (ACT science: high, 
medium, low) x 3 (vignette cause type: artificial, random, natural) x 3 (valence: positive, 
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neutral, negative) mixed-model repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. Mauchly’s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated; therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity for within-
subjects effects.  
 This analysis revealed a main effect of condition. As predicted, participants in the 
cognitive load condition allotted significantly higher purpose ratings to non-intentional 
events (M = 2.96, SE = .01) than those in the control condition (M = 2.66, SE = .11), F(1, 
110) = 4.16, p < .05, partial η2 = .04, indicating that cognitive load produces more errors 
in teleological reasoning. The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of ACT 
group, F(2, 110) = 3.70, p < .05, partial η2 = .06. Post-hoc analyses (Fisher’s Least 
Significant Difference for all post-hoc tests) revealed that participants in the high ACT 
group gave significantly lower purpose ratings to non-intentional events (M = 2.55, SE = 
1.30) than those in the low ACT group (M = 3.04, SE = .14), p < .01. No significant 
differences were found between the high and medium ACT group and between the low 
and medium ACT group (M = 2.85, SE = .122) (see Figure 1). 
 A main effect of cause type was found, F(1.89, 208.20) = 14.12, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .114. Post-hoc tests revealed teleological errors were made significantly more for 
items with an artificial cause type (M = 2.96, SE = .09) than for those with a random 
cause type (M = 2.60, SE = .08), p < .01. Also, teleological errors were made significantly 
more for items with a natural cause type (M = 2.88, SE = .09) than for those with a 
random cause type, p < .01. Errors for items with artificial and natural cause types did not 
significantly differ from one another (see Figure 2).  
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 There was also a main effect of outcome valence, F(1.79, 196.77) = 35.66, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .245. Post-hoc tests revealed that teleological errors were made 
significantly more for items with positive outcomes (M = 3.22, SE = .11) than for neutral 
outcomes (M = 2.46, SE = .08) and negative outcomes (M = 2.75, SE = .08), p’s < .001. 
Also, errors for negative outcomes were significantly higher than those for neutral 
outcomes, p < .001 (see Figure 3). These main effects were subsumed by a significant 
Cause type X Valence interaction, F(3.96, 435.61) = 3.14, p < .05, partial η2 = .028. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to inspect purpose ratings for each level of 
valence at each level of cause type, which revealed that the pattern of ratings for valence 
demonstrated by the main effect held up except for items with random cause types. 
Specifically, errors for neutral and negative outcomes did not significantly differ from 
one another for items with a random cause type, p = .73 (see Figure 4) but they did for 
those with an artificial or natural cause type. This pattern was only found in the control 
condition, thus contributing to a 3-way interaction between cause type, valence and 
condition, F(3.96, 435,61) = 2.61, p < .05, partial η2 = .023.  
 In order to determine if the effect of cognitive load and/or ACT group would 
remain significant when considering the influence of religiosity on teleological errors, a 2 
(condition: cognitive load, no cognitive load) x 3 (ACT science: high, medium, low) x 3 
(vignette cause type: artificial, random, natural) x 3 (valence: positive, neutral, negative) 
mixed-model repeated-measures ANCOVA with religiosity scores as a covariate was 
conducted. The ANCOVA revealed that, with religiosity held constant, the differences 
between conditions were no longer significant, F(1, 109) = 2.78, p = .10 and the 
differences between ACT groups were no longer significant, F(2, 109) = .74, p = .48. 
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Religiosity, however, proved to be a highly significant factor contributing to the variance, 
F(1, 109) = 37.86, p < .01, partial η2 = .26. With religiosity held constant, the main 
effects of cause type, F(1.88, 205.48) = .69, p = .50, and valence, F(1.80, 196.37) = 1.74, 
p = .84, were no longer observed.  
 Outcome valence significantly interacted with religiosity as a covariate, F(1.80, 
296.31) = 3.50, p < .05, partial η2  = .03. To investigate this interaction, repeated-
measures ANCOVAS were completed for each cause type. There was a significant 
Religiosity X Outcome Valence interaction for items with a random cause type, F(1.85, 
201.30) = 6.43, p < .01, partial η2  = .06, for items with a natural cause type, F(1.89, 
206.41) = 3.11, p < .05, partial η2  = .03, but not for items with an artificial cause type. 
Also, a significant interaction was observed between ACT group and cause type, F(3.77, 
205.40) = 2.55, p < .05, partial η2  = .05. Inspection of this interaction revealed that 
scores did not differ by ACT group for items with artificial or natural cause types. 
However, for items with a random cause type, the medium ACT group made significantly 
more errors (M = 2.77, SE = 12) than the high ACT group (M = 2.35, SE = .13), p < .05. 
No significant differences were found between high and low ACT groups (M = 2.67, SE 
= .14) or the low and medium ACT groups. This interaction was not predicted and is not 
readily interpretable.  
Analyses at Each Level of Religiosity 
 The main research question was to ascertain whether or not the individuals low in 
religiosity merely suppress the teleological bias. Therefore, participants were designated 
to one of three groups based on their average religiosity score. To determine grouping, 
percentiles were generated to produce three equal groups (cut offs at ~33% and ~66%) 
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based on religiosity scores. Religiosity was high in this sample (M = 2.88, SD = .88) and 
the grouping reflects this finding. Individuals with a religiosity score 2.50 or lower were 
designated as the “low” religiosity group (n = 39), individuals with a religiosity score 
between 2.60 and 3.50 were designated to the “moderately high” religiosity group (n 
=37), and those with a religiosity score 3.50 and higher were designated to the “very 
high” religiosity group (n = 40). A 2 (condition: cognitive load, no cognitive load) x 3 
(religiosity group: low, moderately high, very high) 3 (vignette cause type: artificial, 
random, neutral) x 3 (outcome type: positive, negative, neutral) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs done to compare purpose ratings between the religiosity groups and conditions. 
There was a main effect of religiosity group, F(2, 443.95) = 24.30, p < .01, partial η2  = 
.31. Those in the low religiosity group allotted significantly less purpose ratings (M = 
2.24, SE = .11) than both the moderately high (M = 2.88, SE = .11) and the very high 
religiosity groups (M = 3.30, SE = .11). The very high group allotted significantly higher 
purpose ratings than both the moderately high and low groups. Religiosity group and 
condition did not significantly interact, but the interaction approached significance F(2, 
443.95) = 2.74, p = .07, partial η2  = .05. 
 Despite the lack of an interaction between religiosity group and condition, a more 
thorough inspection of the effects of condition on low religiosity individuals required a 
priori comparisons to be completed. To determine the extent to which cognitive load 
impacted teleological reasoning in individuals low in religiosity, 2 (condition: cognitive 
load, no cognitive load) x 3 (vignette cause type: artificial, random, neutral) x 3 (outcome 
type: positive, negative, neutral) repeated-measures ANOVAs done separately for three 
levels of religiosity. No main effect of condition was found for those in the moderately 
 31 
high and very high religiosity groups. However, as predicted, a main effect of condition 
was found for individuals low in religiosity, F(1, 37) = 4.82, p < .05, partial η2 = .12. 
Specifically, scores were higher for low religiosity individuals in the cognitive load 
condition (M = 2.50, SE = .18) than for those in the control condition (M = 1.97, SE = 
.18) (see Figure 5). 
Beliefs in a Purposeful World Analysis  
 To determine how cognitive load, ACT science reasoning, and religiosity impact 
participants’ perspective on a purposeful world, a 2 (condition: cognitive load, no 
cognitive load) x 3 (ACT science: high, medium, low)  ANCOVA with religiosity scores 
as a covariate was conducted. Inconsistent with my predictions, purposeful world belief 
scores did not differ by condition, F(1, 109) = .002, p = .96. However, a main effect of 
ACT group was found, F(2, 109) = 3.1, p = .05, partial η2  = .05. Post-hoc analysis 
revealed the high ACT group demonstrated significantly lower purposeful world belief 
scores (M = 4.65, SE = .22) compared to the low ACT group (M = 5.41, SE = .24), p < 
.05. The high ACT group did not significantly differ from the medium ACT group (M = 
5.45, SE = .21) and the low and medium ACT groups did not significantly differ from 
one another. Religiosity was found to be a highly significant factor accounting for the 
variance in purposeful world belief scores, F(1, 109) = 48.68, p < .01, partial η2  = .31.  
Discussion 
Summary of Findings  
 Consistent with my predictions, the results of this study indicate that when 
processing resources are limited, even college-attending adults are prone to making 
teleological errors in reasoning about events. Specifically, individuals placed under 
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cognitive load made significantly more errors than those who did not. Also as predicted, 
science reasoning was found to be an important factor, with those with the lowest ACT 
science reasoning scores committing significantly more errors than those with high ACT 
scores. Thus, although it appears that appreciation of scientific principles serves as a 
major contributor to one’s likelihood to imbue purpose on non-intentional events, these 
errors are amplified by the demands of the situation. Inconsistent with prior predictions 
however were the types of situations that tend to provoke teleological errors. These 
results indicate that events with artificial or natural cause types inspired the higher levels 
of teleological reasoning compared to those with a random cause type. Moreover, events 
with positive and negative outcomes received higher purpose ratings than those with 
neutral outcomes. This finding is inconsistent with a prior study, which found errors to 
only be especially high for positive outcomes. Although positive outcomes were rated 
with significantly more purpose than negative outcomes, this present study suggests that 
outcomes at either extreme of valence inspire teleological reasoning.  
 Religiosity was found to be an extremely important factor; when analyzed as a 
covariate variable, cognitive load and scientific reasoning were no longer significant as 
between-subjects variables for beliefs in the purpose of events. That is, when the variance 
accounted for by religiosity is held constant, no significant differences are found among 
individuals on purpose ratings based on processing resources or scientific reasoning. 
Moreover, no differences based on the type of cause (i.e., artificial, random, natural) or 
valences of outcome (i.e., positive, neutral, negative) were found. Thus, it appears that, of 
all the variables included in this study, religiosity is the single most important contributor 
to teleological errors. However, when selectively examining the data, this does not appear 
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to be the full story. The results showed that, for low religiosity individuals in particular, 
cognitive load significantly increased teleological errors. No differences were found 
between conditions for those who scored higher in religiosity. Thus, it appears that 
individuals low in religiosity do in fact suppress the teleological bias and cognitively 
demanding situations weaken this ability. By contrast, those high in religiosity appear to 
be unaffected by cognitive load perhaps because such explicitly held beliefs in the 
purpose of events do not change as a function of situational demands. 
 Interestingly, my prediction that cognitive load would inflate beliefs in a 
purposeful world was not met. Scores on this measure were inflated in general (M = 5.09, 
SD = 1.68 on a 7-point scale) and did not change as a function of cognitive load with 
religiosity held constant. Religiosity and ACT however were found to be significant 
contributors to participants’ beliefs in a purposeful world. Thus, it appears that one’s 
explicit faith and appreciation of scientific knowledge contributes to whether or not they 
endorse statements suggesting that the world is purposeful in general (e.g., “Everything 
happens for a reason”) rather than processing resources. These results suggest that these 
beliefs are, a) readily accessible, b) generally high and c) heavily tied to individual 
differences in religiosity and scientific reasoning.  
Teleological Reasoning: The Type of Event Matters  
 Putting individual differences in religiosity and scientific reasoning aside, the 
current study found that certain characteristics of an event in part determine the 
likelihood that a teleological error will be made. Specifically, events that are caused by 
artificial (e.g., brake failure) and natural (e.g., fog) forces were seen as more purposeful 
than those with random causes (e.g., a coin toss). This finding was not anticipated and 
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Svedholm et al. (2010) did not report such a distinction between the types of force 
causing the event. It appears that, within this sample, individuals appreciated the non-
intentional nature of random forces more than artificial or natural forces. Such a result 
appears to conflict with a recent study which showed that participants tend to resist the 
explanations of randomness in favor of explanations implying order and purpose 
(Rutjens, Pligt, & Harreveld, 2010). Although Bering (2011) discusses how natural 
events often provoke teleological processing (e.g., hurricanes, tsunamis) and Kelemen 
and Rosset (2009) found that adults made the most errors for items suggesting that nature 
is an intentional force, previous research does not reveal how other types of causal forces 
might inspire (or fail to inspire) teleological processing. Integral to Bering’s (2002) ideas, 
however, is the notion of surprise entailed with an event. That is, unexpected events are 
predicted to invoke the most teleological processing. Upon inspecting the items, one can 
speculate that items with a random cause type (e.g., coin toss, dealt the 3 of clubs) were 
simply less surprising than those with artificial cause types (e.g., brakes fail, power 
outage) and natural cause types (e.g., thunderstorm, lightning strike). Therefore, the 
effect of cause type may be attributed to the types of items used in this study and any 
theoretical speculation should be made cautiously.  
 This study does further illuminate the importance of the emotional impact of an 
event’s outcome on teleological reasoning. Specifically, events with valenced outcomes 
were rated as happening for a purpose more than events with neutral outcomes and this 
effect was especially pronounced for positive outcomes. This finding further refines the 
proposed effect of emotional salience that has been discussed in previous literature. 
Specifically, Skaggs and Baron (2006) discussed how a common theme in trauma 
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literature is the process of making meaning following a negative event. That is, people 
tend to seek out the purpose behind a negative event because their expectations have been 
violated. Bering (2002; 2003) has placed much emphasis on the importance of emotional 
impact the event has on the individual; arguing that those that are affect-laden will 
provoke far more searching for purpose than mundane events. This idea coincides with 
Gray and Wegner’s (2010) suggestion that we seek out agency behind events of “unjust 
suffering and undeserved salvation” that lack a clear human cause. Such a proposal is 
intuitive; why would we waste cognitive resources considering the purpose behind 
mundane events? Rather, the events that evoke an emotional response inspire us to seek 
out the purpose behind the event, even if none exists. Once this purpose is discovered (or 
conjectured), it can be more neatly accommodated into our life narrative.  
 The present study found that, when considering hypothetical vignettes, 
individuals ascribed higher levels of purpose to events that were affect-laden at both 
positive and negative directions. However, this study also provides empirical evidence 
that people tend to find events with positive outcomes as more purposeful than both 
negative and neutral outcomes. Perhaps this effect is due to what Weinstein (1980) 
describes as “unrealistic optimism” or people’s tendency to estimate the occurrence 
events with positive outcomes as far more likely than events with negative outcomes. It 
seems that people are not only biased in their predictions about positive outcomes, but 
they also tend imbue more intentionality behind their causes. That is, people seem to 
think that an intentional force is acting behind events with good outcomes, perhaps 
because of a belief that they deserve such outcomes. Particularly relevant to this 
motivational aspect of teleological reasoning about events is the widely studied belief in a 
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just world (Hafer & Begue, 2005). The general proposal behind just-world theory is that 
people are driven to believe the world operates in a way so that people get what they 
deserve: good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people (Lerner, 
1980). Bering (2002) has suggested that EToM will be activated when an unexpected 
event “deviates from or conforms to culturally scripted just world expectations” (p. 18). 
That is, such events may be interpreted as enforcing a sort of justice upon the individuals 
affected because they are ultimately deserving of their fate. Thus, imbuing purpose upon 
non-intentional events may ease the anxiety associated with violations of our 
expectancies in a similar way that just-world beliefs do. Moreover, when it comes to 
considering scenarios relevant to the self, our tendency for unrealistic optimism biases us 
to believe that positive outcomes are the result of some intentional force.  
Teleological Errors: Universal Tendency or Individual Differences? 
 Although our likelihood to commit teleological errors seems to depend on the 
type of event that has occurred, the present study also addresses two other important 
factors: the conditions that inspire teleological errors and the types of people who are 
likely to commit them. Similar to the results found by Kelemen and Rosset (2009), this 
study found that college-attending adults committed significantly more teleological errors 
when placed under processing demands and that this effect was most pronounced for 
individuals with low scientific reasoning ability. The present study extends upon these 
findings with a study in which participants made judgments about life events rather than 
object categories. Thus, it appears that teleological beliefs about both events and objects 
are vulnerable to factors such as cognitive resources and scientific knowledge. According 
to Kelemen and Rosset, teleological explanations become constrained by scientific 
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knowledge, rather than replaced, and therefore can be exposed by compromising one’s 
ability to invoke cognitive control over their explanations. Thus, teleological reasoning 
perseverates throughout development as an explanatory default and extra cognitive 
resources are required to override this default. Such faulty reasoning becomes expressed 
not only when considering the teleo-function of object categories, but also our life events.  
 These ideas are consistent with Bering’s (2002) assertion that looking for the 
purpose is much like a “knee-jerk” reaction that must be actively suppressed. However, 
Bering describes this tendency as being the result of an active Existential Theory of Mind 
(EToM), which, much like ordinary Theory of Mind, processes information for the 
potential intentionality. According to him, the EToM system evolved and develops with 
Theory of Mind, however responds specifically to events. Therefore, EToM is likely to 
have a biological basis and operates universally in all individuals. Combining the ideas of 
Kelemen and Rosset (2009) and Bering, the results of the present study can be interpreted 
as such: both cognitive control and scientific knowledge are needed to suppress the 
responding of the EToM. Thus, imbuing purpose upon events seems to be so intuitive, 
that only those with the means (i.e., cognitive resources) and the knowledge (e.g., 
appreciation of scientific principles) are able to sufficiently suppress it. This perspective 
helps explain why those under cognitive load and those with low science reasoning 
scores were so prone to teleological error.  
 Svedholm et al. (2010) oppose this perspective, however and have argued that 
beliefs in the purpose of events are a function of individual differences in superstitious 
beliefs, rather than a universal (yet mutable) tendency. In their study, highly superstitious 
individuals were significantly more likely than skeptics to endorse the beliefs in the 
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purpose of events. However, it can be argued that the participants in their study were 
responding in a way that is most consistent with their ideological beliefs (i.e., suppression 
of teleological reasoning for skeptics and facilitation of teleological reasoning for highly 
superstitious individuals) because they had the cognitive capacity to do so. The present 
study provided the opportunity to tap into beliefs that might be more implicitly held by 
reducing cognitive resources. Because cognitive load led to more errors, it seems 
teleological reasoning is not solely a function of individual differences. A major 
challenge to this conclusion however is that fact that when religiosity is controlled for, 
cognitive load was no longer a significant factor contributing to teleological errors. Thus, 
it might be argued that expressions of teleological errors are, to a higher degree, a 
function of differences in faith rather than situational influences. This conclusion 
however, is still too simplistic.  
 Given that the interaction between religiosity and condition was not significant, it 
appears initially that religiosity trumps the effect of condition. However, this was not the 
case at every level of religiosity. Specifically, those with the lowest religiosity scores 
were the only group to be affected by cognitive load. Such a finding supports Bering’s 
(2002) assertion that even ideological atheists, who may reject the idea of an abstract 
external agent such as God, may nevertheless be compelled to question the purpose 
behind of events. The findings here coincide with those of Weeks and Lupfer (2000), 
which found participants of low religiosity frequently referred to supernatural forces 
(e.g., “fate”) as arbiters behind events. That is, although ideological atheists may 
explicitly reject the existence of an agent such as God, the tendency to seek out 
intentionality behind events operates at a much more intuitive level and, if provoked, may 
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be expressed in alternative ways (e.g., believing in fate or merely asking “why did this 
happen to me”). Presumably then, low religiosity individuals in the present study may 
explicitly reject faith (i.e., as measured by the religiosity scale), yet are more likely to rate 
non-intentional events as happening for a purpose if cognitive resources have been 
compromised.  
 Perhaps the best way to conceptualize this apparent disagreement is with a dual-
process model perspective, an increasingly popular way to explain human reasoning 
(Evans, 2008). According to this model, human reasoning is guided by two systems that 
compete for expression. System 1 incorporates reasoning that is quick, intuitive, implicit, 
and operates independent of working memory. System 2 on the other hand is effortful, 
analytical, explicit, and is constrained by working memory. Although both systems may 
operate simultaneously, system 2 requires cognitive effort to override the responding of 
system 1. The results of the present study provide an eloquent example of how these two 
systems operate in teleological reasoning. For individuals with low religiosity, the ability 
to suppress system 1 (i.e., teleological reasoning) can be compromised, as evidenced by 
the higher number of errors under cognitive load. Those higher in religiosity are 
unaffected by cognitive load because they endorse teleological beliefs at both the implicit 
and explicit level. That is, religious individuals do not resist teleological errors because 
their faith encourages them to believe that every event happens for a purpose. Therefore, 
it seems that there are two paths to teleological beliefs: one at the explicit level (i.e., 
religious faith) and one at the implicit level (i.e., teleological reasoning). Religion then, 
appears to make our teleological intuitions concrete by offering dogma to elucidate the 
agent and meaning behind our life events. This same line of reasoning can be further 
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applied to explain the lack of effect cognitive load had on beliefs in a purposeful world. 
These beliefs were highly correlated with religiosity and perhaps tap the same construct 
of “promiscuous teleology” (Kelemen, 1999a), which is easily accessible and readily 
endorsed in these individuals.  
 The seemingly incongruent relationship between religiosity and analytics is 
perhaps most striking when looking at the strongly negative correlation between 
religiosity and ACT science reasoning scores. It seems that a tendency to reject religious 
intuitions is robustly associated with an appreciation of scientific principles. In fact, a 
recent study provided evidence that various experimental manipulations to induce 
analytic reasoning caused reductions in religiosity scores (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). 
Also drawing upon a dual-process model, these authors concluded that analytic 
processing inhibits system 1 processing which presumably underlies the intuitive nature 
religious cognition. The results of the present study complement their conclusions by 
providing an example of how weakening the ability to reason analytically promotes 
system 1 processing. Both studies illustrate how our beliefs are relatively subject to our 
ability to deploy effortful cognitive processing. This is not to say that religiosity is the 
result of poor analytical thinking, rather how intuition and analytics operate on two 
distinct systems of reasoning that are at odds with one another at times. 
Implications of Findings  
 The present investigation sheds light on aspects of teleological reasoning that 
until now, had yet to be explored. Specifically, teleological beliefs were measured using a 
questionnaire aimed to target individuals’ beliefs about real life events and created 
conditions that resemble the demands we experience in everyday life. Much of the 
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previous research had concentrated on reasoning about object categories and the results 
of the present study suggest that even college attending adults err about events in a 
similar way. That is, for both objects and life events, we instinctively attribute purpose 
unless we have both the ability and knowledge to suppress it. Perhaps then, teleological 
errors of any kind reflect the activation of the same underlying mechanism. There has 
been theoretical disagreement, however, as to what mechanism underlies our propensity 
to make teleological errors.  
 Kelemen (1999b) has suggested that teleological beliefs grow out of children’s 
early experiences with learning about intentionality and goal-directed behavior and are at 
first promiscuously applied to all object categories but are eventually constrained by later 
acquired knowledge. Bering (2002) employed an evolutionary approach and asserted that 
our tendency to seek purpose reflects the activation of a biological mechanism, EToM, 
which is specialized for seeking intentionality behind events. A third perspective, offered 
by Svedholm et al. (2010), argues that looking for the purpose behind events is a type of 
superstitious belief moderated by a failure to appreciate core knowledge distinctions. 
Although the present study is not able to precisely illuminate the underlying cause of 
teleological errors, it does clarify how they operate. From the present results, it appears 
that teleological beliefs operate at both the implicit and explicit level. That is, teleological 
beliefs are not solely the expression of individual differences (i.e., religiosity, science 
reasoning) or situational influences (i.e., cognitive demands), but rather both.  
 Although this study has only clarified the role of these factors in how teleological 
beliefs operate, a speculation can be made to address this theoretical disagreement. 
Perhaps evolution has predisposed the human species to filter information, be it object, 
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behavior, or events, for potential purpose. Such a tendency is evolutionarily beneficial—
it would be adaptive to be acutely aware of the utility and intentionality behind the things 
we encounter in life because a) we appreciate the potential functionality of objects we 
encounter and b) appreciate agency in the environment, which is important for detecting 
predators and intentions of our conspecifics. This biologically based propensity might 
rapidly increase in expression around early childhood when object manipulation 
(Kelemen, 1999b) and mental state appreciation (Bering & Parker, 2006). As humans 
further develop, their environment either constrains or elaborates upon this tendency. 
That is, exposure to complex scientific principles (e.g., biology, physics) or ideological 
expression (e.g., agnosticism, atheism) leads one to suppress the teleological stance. By 
contrast, religiosity and superstitious beliefs outright sanction our teleological errors (e.g., 
God or Fate was responsible for this random event). Although these later influences 
affect how our explicit teleological beliefs are expressed, our teleological intuitions, both 
biologically inherent and developmentally critical, persist to guide our implicit beliefs. 
These implicit beliefs may not be obvious in religious and superstitious individuals, 
because they explicitly endorse teleological errors. However, their expression in 
individuals who score low on these constructs when cognitive resources are limited 
provide evidence that filtering information for potential purpose in some way reflects a 
default style of reasoning. It is up to future research however to determine if a specific 
module (e.g., EToM) can in fact be found at the biological level.  
 Regardless of the mechanism for teleological errors, a better understanding of 
how and why adults reason in unwarranted teleological ways poses a variety of 
implications for how people function in everyday life. A strong belief that one’s life has a 
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purpose has been found to have a profound impact on well-being. Specifically, purpose in 
life beliefs mediate the relationship between religiosity and happiness (French & Joseph, 
1999) and moderate the relationship between depression and suicide ideation (Heisel & 
Flett, 2004). Thus, it seems psychologically advantageous to have an answer to the 
philosophical quandary of why am I here? Therefore, what might be deemed as an error 
in reasoning literature might be considered a useful tool in promoting psychological 
health in clinical settings.  
  It has been suggested that human’s teleo-functional beliefs are applied to the self 
in a fashion similar to our teleological reasoning about objects (Bering, 2010). This sort 
of reasoning is immediately apparent in people’s beliefs about destiny and God’s (or 
some similar entity’s) use of natural events (e.g., an earthquake) to communicate some 
sort of message to us. As Bering points out, a belief in the purpose in one’s life may be 
seemingly innocuous, but suicide missions inspired by a belief that the act had been 
ordained by a higher power provide disturbing examples of how extreme such beliefs can 
be (p. 292). This line of research suggests that humans are compelled to filter their 
experiences for their teleological purpose to give meaning to the autobiographical 
experiences that make up one’s life and this compulsion may be rooted in more 
fundamental cognitive processes. Moreover, this study and others like it (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012; Svedholm et al., 2010) have the potential to further our knowledge 
about religious or superstitious thinking. That is, these types of belief systems may not be 
solely a product of cultural indoctrination, but also the result of ordinary cognitive 
processing. In light of the present results, it appears that a teleological bias is one factor 
that underlies religious cognition at both an implicit and explicit level. This finding 
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further contributes to a body of work indicating that religiosity is a product of ordinary 
cognition rather than mere culture or psychological ailment (see Barret, 2011).  
Limitations and Outstanding Questions  
 Although the present findings are intriguing, interpretations must be made with 
caution, as this study is not without limitations. Based on these limitations, outstanding 
questions and directions for future research can be put forth. First, limitations exist in 
how the experiment was conducted. As previously discussed, items with random cause 
types inspired significantly less teleological errors than expected. Any future use of this 
scale as a measure of beliefs in the purpose events ought to check and potentially correct 
for a lack of surprise with these items. Moreover, although participants were encouraged 
to consider the scenarios in the Beliefs in the Purpose of Events questionnaire as if they 
actually transpired, the study nevertheless suffers for some lack of ecological validity. Put 
simply, considering each hypothetical event for approximately 14 seconds does not 
equate to actually experiencing the event and therefore, the present results may reflect an 
underrepresentation of teleological beliefs. Based on the findings of Skaggs and Baron 
(2006), one could argue that our actual experiences receive the more teleological 
processing because they become incorporated into our life narrative, whereas considering 
hypothetical scenarios may not invoke the same level of teleological processing. Perhaps 
future research should adopt a more qualitative approach to inquire how people react to 
actual life events that vary by expectancy and valence to determine if a pattern of 
teleological processing similar to the present findings emerges. Similarly, it is difficult to 
assert that the cognitive load method chosen (i.e., an auditory task) sufficiently resembles 
the busyness and perhaps stress of real life events. Moreover, the method used here is one 
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of many styles of cognitive load induction (Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 
2003). Therefore, future research should also attempt to validate the present results 
utilizing other forms of cognitive load induction.  
 Although the SCSORFQ was chosen as a measure of religiosity for its high 
reliability and nondenominational quality (Plante & Boccacini, 1997), other measures of 
religiosity should be used to validate and further expand upon the present findings. For 
example, the Intrinsic-Extrinsic measure of Allport and Ross’s (1967) Religious 
Orientation scale which differentiate different motivations for adherence to religion. 
Those who score high on the extrinsic dimension tend to view religiosity as a means to an 
end (e.g., go to church to maintain a social network). Those who score high on the 
intrinsic dimension truly believe the tenets of their religion and employ its teachings to 
drive their behavior. It would be interesting to replicate the present study but distinguish 
participants who are intrinsically vs. extrinsically motivated in their religiosity. Perhaps 
those with extrinsic beliefs would perform more variably under cognitive load, as their 
beliefs are only explicitly held and are therefore more vulnerable to distraction. 
Moreover, although the SCSORFQ is a good measure of religious faith and engagement, 
it by no means captures the totality of one’s religiosity. That is, religiosity is likely to be 
more nuanced than what can be captured by this single measure, and interpretation of the 
present results should made with this in mind.  
 Issues with interpreting the results should also be noted. Religiosity, which was 
found to be a rather important factor contributing to teleological errors, was quite high in 
this sample (M = 2.88, SD = .88, on a 4-point scale). This trend is not surprising, 
considering the high rates of religious adherence, as measured by reported affiliation and 
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regular attendance of service, in the state of Kentucky (51.6% across denominations and 
33% of the Evangelical Protestant tradition Grammich, Hadaway, Houseal, Jones, & 
Krindatch, et al., 2010). Therefore, it may be difficult to generalize these results across to 
other geographical areas with different religious adherence rates and dominant religious 
traditions. However, this “limitation” actually sheds further light on teleological 
reasoning. Kelemen and Rosset (2009) did not find an effect of beliefs in God on 
teleological errors for object categories. The participants in their study however, were 
students attending the prestigious Boston University. The individuals who participated in 
the present study were recruited from a public university in the south, and therefore 
provide a unique perspective into how a different group of college-attending adults 
reason teleologically. Moreover, the individuals who participated in this study had an 
average ACT science reasoning score (M = 21.48, SD = 4.06) that closely represented the 
national average (i.e., a score of 21 represents the 56th percentile according to national 
norms, ACT 2012). ACT science reasoning scores were found to be positively associated 
with number of teleological errors for events and beliefs in a purposeful world. This 
finding poses larger implications for our education system, in that a poor appreciation of 
scientific principles is associated with hyper-attribution of purpose to non-intentional 
events and the world in general. Thus, this study provides some insight into how a 
population of students errs about non-intentional forces at a national level. However, the 
instructions (See Appendix A) were deliberately vague enough to encourage a subjective 
or objective interpretation of “purpose.” Perhaps then, the present study could be 
confounded by a difference in interpretation of “purpose”, one that implies literal 
intentionality or one that implies supernatural forces (e.g., karma, fate, God). It would be 
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interesting to replicate the present study to compare two explicit definitions of purpose to 
determine whether or not how “purpose” is defined is critical. Perhaps individuals high in 
religiosity will suppress their explicit belief system in favor of more analytic rationality if 
instructed to think about “purpose” in the most literal sense of the word.  
Conclusions  
 In summary, it appears that college-attending adults remain prone to teleological 
errors when reasoning about events. The present findings highlight several factors that 
contribute to this tendency, including the emotional impact and cause type of the event, 
the cognitive resources available, and individual differences in religiosity and scientific 
appreciation. Moreover, the present study expands our understanding of promiscuous 
teleology beyond how humans think about object categories, but to scenarios designed to 
mimic real life situations. Teleological errors appear to reflect reasoning conducted at an 
intuitive and easily accessible level. By contrast, resisting such intuitive explanations 
requires explicit rejection in the purpose of events, which appears to depend on scientific 
appreciation, working memory capability, and lower levels of religious faith. These 
findings pose implications for both how human reasoning operates, but also the cognitive 
foundations for which we base our religious beliefs. Educators should be aware of how 
such faulty reasoning is fostered, and clinicians might have a better understanding of how 
their patients rationalize both tragedy and good fortune. It is up to future investigations to 
pinpoint the source of teleological beliefs and perhaps develop a more precise model of 
how teleological beliefs are founded and cultivated or constrained throughout 
development.   
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Appendix A: Vignettes to Assess Beliefs in the Purpose of Events (Adapted from 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007) 
Instructions: 
When something happens, people sometimes think that the event happened for a 
“purpose” even though we don’t know what the purpose is. These phrases can mean 
many different things and sometimes they are simply used out of habit. In this study, the 
expressions are used in the following sense. An event happens for a purpose if you think 
it was intentionally caused by a visible or an invisible agent. Now imagine the following 
things happened to you. It is important that you try to picture the situations.  
Each of the situations will be presented to you on the screen for approximately 7 seconds 
and then will be presented again for another 7 seconds with the event in question 
underlined. There will be a brief pause between each scenario.  To what extent do you 
believe the underlined event happened for a purpose? 
Scale:  
1= The event definitely did not have a purpose 
2= The event probably did not have a purpose 
3= Not sure/ No opinion 
4= There was some kind of purpose 
5= The event clearly had a purpose 
(Intentional, Positive) 
1. A person that you are attracted to kisses you in the middle of the street and you start 
going out together. [5.91] 
2. You do your upmost for an interview and receive the job. [6.72] 
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(Intentional, Neutral) 
3. You lend your classmate a pencil during an exam and they return it to you afterwards. 
[4.86] 
4. You drive to your place of work and have a typical day on the job. [4.49] 
(Intentional, Negative) 
5. Your colleague teases you regularly and your job performance declines. [1.77] 
6. Your neighbor spreads an undesirable rumor about you around the neighborhood and 
you are not invited to a block party. [2.49] 
(Artificial, Positive) 
7. A long electrical power outage occurs and to pass the time you and your partner make 
love. After nine months a much hoped-for baby is born. [6.00] 
8. Your brakes fail and you get into a minor accident with an individual who you will 
eventually marry. [4.95] 
(Artificial, Neutral) 
9. A server fails and you cannot send or receive email for two days. [2.88]  
Item changed to A server fails and you cannot send or receive email for an hour.  
10. City traffic becomes seriously jammed and you decide to take the bus to work. [3.74] 
(Artificial, Negative) 
11. The brakes on your car fail and the resulting crash causes you serious injury. [1.51] 
12. An electrical fault causes a fire and your home is destroyed. [1.40] 
(Random, Positive) 
13. A coin you toss lands on heads and you win a large amount of money. [6.35] 
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14. You unexpectedly run across a former heartthrob and you start going out together. 
[5.63] 
(Random, Neutral) 
15. You are dealt the 3 of clubs and you break even in a poker game. [4.72] 
16. You are randomly selected by a computer and asked to complete a customer 
satisfaction survey. [New] 
(Random, Negative) 
17. You only get clubs and spades in a game of cards and therefore run up large debts. 
[1.70] 
18. A stone falls from a scaffold unexpectedly and you get seriously injured. [1.35] 
(Natural, Positive) 
19. Fog delays the departure of your plane and you meet a person at the airport who you 
will become engaged to after a year. [5.58] 
20. A power outage happens during a thunderstorm and you have to do a big job by hand. 
Your boss praises your skills and you later get a raise. [6.05] 
(Natural, Neutral) 
21. A snow storm delays the departure of your train and you read a book. [4.60] 
22. A lightning strike topples a big tree in your garden, but causes no other harm. [4.49] 
(Natural, Negative) 
23. Lightning strikes the house you are living in and you lose your home. [1.37] 
24. You catch a bacterial infection while traveling abroad and fall ill for a long time. 
[1.63] 
* Number shown in brackets represent average valence ratings on a scale from 1 = 
“absolutely negative” to 5 = “absolutely positive.” 
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Appendix B: Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997) 
 
Instructions:  
Please answer the following questions about religious faith using the scale below.  
Indicate the level of agreement (or disagreement) for each statement. 
 
1 = strongly disagree   2 = disagree   3 = agree   4 = strongly agree 
1.  My religious faith is extremely important to me. 
2.  I pray daily. 
3.  I look to my faith as a source of inspiration. 
4.  I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life. 
5.  I consider myself active in my faith or church. 
6.  My faith is an important part of who I am as a person. 
7.  My relationship with God is extremely important to me. 
8.  I enjoy being around others who share my faith. 
9.  I look to my faith as a source of comfort. 
10.  My faith impacts many of my decisions. 
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Document 
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Appendix D: Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables (N = 116) 
  
Minimu
m Maximum Mean SD 
ACT Science Reasoning 14.00 35.00 21.48 4.06 
Teleological Errors 1.00 4.61 2.82 .82 
Purposeful World Beliefs 1.00 7.00 5.09 1.70  
Religiosity Scores 1.00 4.00 2.88 .88 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix among Main Variables 
 
 
Teleological 
Errors 
Purposeful 
World Beliefs 
Religiosity 
ACT Science 
Reasoning -.268** -.360** -.279** 
Teleological 
Errors  .698** .557** 
Purposeful 
World Beliefs   .596** 
Note. **p < 0.01 
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Figure 1. Mean purpose ratings by ACT group.  
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Figure 2. Mean purpose ratings by vignette cause type. 
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 Figure 3. Mean purpose ratings by outcome type.  
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Figure 4. Marginal mean purpose ratings for vignette Cause type X Vignette outcome 
valence interaction.  
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Figure 5. Mean purpose ratings for each religiosity group by condition 
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